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PERSONAL LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS IN
NEW YORK
HENRY S. FRASER*
INTRODUCTORY
The well-known danger of placing a large lump sum of money in
the hands of an inexperienced widow is perhaps the greatest con-
tributing factor to the phenomenal spread of the personal life in-
surance trust idea. By such a trust many a husband is arranging for
the proceeds of his life insurance to be paid to a local trust company
and administered by it after his death according to a plan outlined
in the trust instrument. In this way the money is scientifically invested
and the income paid to the widow and children at convenient inter-
vals according to the terms of the trust agreement. The trust in-
strument will also provide for the ultimate disposition of the principal,
and it may contain special features dealing with advancements of
principal to meet emergencies, the expenses of an education, etc.
In order to create such a trust the insured may either name the
bank as the trustee-beneficiary in the policies, or he may assign the
policies to the bank. At the same time that the policies are delivered
to the bank, an instrunent is prepared and executed by the parties
in which the manner of administering the proceeds of the insurance
is set forth. On occasion the insured also transfers to the trust
company securities of an income-producing nature and directs in the
instrument that the bank shall hold such securities in trust during
his lifetime and use the income to pay the premiums on the policies.
the instrument will also provide for the disposition of the income-
producing property after the death of the insured. This last stated
trust is known as a funded trust. The vast majority, however, of
personal life insurance trusts are unfunded, i. e., no income-producing
property is transferred to the bank during the lifetime of the insured,
the insured continues to pay the premiums although the possession
of the policies may be given to the trust company.
I. THE NATURE OF PERSONAL LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS
(a) Unfunded trust where policies are not assigned.
Resolved into its essential parts and irrespective of the labels and
phraseology customarily employed, what is a personal unfunded life
insurance trust? During the recent rise of this type of trust, many
perplexing questions have been asked about its legal incidents. The
*Member of the firm of Brown, Fraser & Black, Syracuse, N. Y.
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difficulty of these questions springs inevitably from the unique nature
of life insurance. Throughout the evolution of the law of insurance,
difficulties have been encountered in attempting to fit the law of this
field, which is distinctly sui generis, into the general pattern of juris-
prudence. The familiar labels crowd for application, but in using
them the courts have sometimes permitted them to becloud the
realities. It is important, therefore, that the progress of life insurance
trusts be attended with a close study by all lawyers of the actual
relations of the parties.
Let us take a typical case of an unfunded arrangement where the
policies are not assigned. In the first place, an instrument is executed
by the bank and the insured by which the bank promises to collect
and administer the proceeds of such policies of insurance on the life
of the insured as he shall make payable to the bank as trustee. The
instrument also sets forth in detail the manner in which the funds
shall be administered and to whom the income and principal shall be
paid. The trust company as trustee is then designated as beneficiary
under the policies, and they are delivered to the bank for safekeeping.
For its services in administering the funds realized from the policies,
the bank will be entitled to the compensation fixed by the agreement.
During his lifetime the insured retains all privileges with respect to the
policies; for example, he may withdraw one or more of the policies, he
may borrow on them, receive dividends and surrender values, and
change the beneficiary named in the policies without the consent of
the trust company. He also pays the premiums, or, if he choose, may
allow one or all of the policies to lapse. If the policies are repossessed
by the insured before his death, the bankwill be entitled to anomninal
sum for the storage of the policies up to the time of withdrawal, such
fee not infrequently being fixed in the instrument.
It will thus be seen that on the death of the insured the trust com-
pany will collect only such amounts as are then payable on policies
kept in force by the insured. Moreover, until the death of the insured
the only duty of the bank is to guard such policies as the insured per-
mits to remain in its custody. As one writer has stated, "There is
really nothing for the trustee to do until the insurance is payable."'
It is to be noted that in the above hypothetical case the policies
are not assigned to the bank. The legal title remains in the insured.
This gives rise to important legal considerations. When the policies
become payable and funds for the first time reach the hands of the
'COLLATERAL AGREEMENTS FOR THE USE OF LiE INSuRANCE PROCEEDS (1928)
55. Published by the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, Mil-
waukee, Wisconsin.
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trust company, it is probably true that such funds are impressed
with a trust character for all purposes.2 The fact, however, that the
legal title in the policies does not pass to the bank during the lifetime
of the insured means that there is no trust of the policies during that
period.3 Upon the insured's death, the bank as the beneficiary named
in the policies takes legal title to the proceeds and for the first time
becomes a trustee. Prior to his death the bank is a bailee of the
policies, the ownership being in the insured and the possession in the
bank.4
Various legal catchwords have been applied from time to time to
the typical unfunded arrangement, described above, in an attempt
to bring it under some familiar category. The theory has sometimes
been advanced, for example, that the unfunded arrangement amounts
to an executory trust during the lifetime of the insured and becomes
an executedtrustuponhis death.5 This conception, however, involves
a misuse of terms. An executory trust, properly so called, is one
in which the limitations are imperfectly declared, the intention of the
2Hirsh v. Auer, 146 N. Y. 13, 40 N. E. 397 (1895); Ditmars v. Smith, 3 App.
Div. 57, 38 N. Y. Supp. 1O36 (4th Dept. x896); Lauterbach v. New York Inv.
Co., 62 Misc. 561, 117 N. Y. Supp. 152 (Sup. Ct. I909), aff'd, 137 App. Div. 919,
122 N. Y. Supp. 1137 (Ist Dept. 19IO).
3Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. v. Des Moines Ry., 254 U. S. 196,208,41 Sup. Ct. 8I,
86 (1920); Brown v. Spohr, I8o N. Y. 201, 73 N. E. 14 (19o4); Central Trust Co.
v. Gaffney, 157 App. Div. 501, 142 N. Y. Supp. 902 (Ist Dept. I913), aff'd, 215
N. Y. 740, IO9 N. E. lO69 (1915); Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Haven, 214 N.
Y. 468, lO8 N. E. 819 (1915); Farjeon v. Fulton Securities Co., 225 App. Div. 541,
233 N. Y. Supp. 577 (Ist Dept. 1929); cf. Butler v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 55
Hun 296, 8 N. Y. Supp. 411 (189o), aff'd, 125 N. Y. 769, 27 N. E. 409 (1891).
At least one author, however, ventures the opinion that a present trust is
created. He believes that the beneficial interest of the bank, although subject to
defeasance by the lapse or withdrawal of the policies, is a sufficient res to support
the trust. DANIEL S. REMSEN, THE PREPARATION OF WILLS AND TRUSTS, (2nd
ed. 1930) 321. (The chapter on life insurance trusts in this work, it is stated in the
preface, was prepared by Gerard T. Remsen).
41t has been claimed that where the bank is named as trustee-beneficiary with-
out reservation in the insured of the right to change the beneficiary, a true trust
comes into being immediately, although the policies are not assigned to the bank.
(PRENTICE-HALL TRUST SERVICE [1928-1930] 2001). It is difficult to assent to
this proposition because the insured has not sought to divest himself of legal
title to the policies. The case is not different from the ordinary situation of a
beneficiary named in a policy under which the insured has no right to change the
beneficiary: the beneficiary does not have title to the policy whatever other rights
he may possess.
5Part 2, PRENTICE-HALL TRAINING SERVICE FOR TRUST OFFICERS, LIFE IN-
SURANCE TRUSTS (1929) 25. Published by Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York.
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settlor being stated in such general terms that something not fully
declared is required to be done in order to perfect the trust.6
Nor is it a "contingent" trust, i. e., an express trust which depends
for its operation upon a future event.' Since the legal title to the
policies remains in the insured, no express trust with the bank as
trustee is initially created; moreover, the insured does not become an
express trustee to the ultimate beneficiaries since he does not intend
to become trustee; nor does he become a constructive trustee for
them. 8
Nor is it a contract to establish a trust in futuro. The insured
does not engage to keep the policies in force for any period of time.
If all the policies were allowed to lapse, no person could complain.
There is an absence of mutuality of obligation. Moreover, it is not a
promise to give property in trust. The insured makes no statement
or representation that he will keep the policies alive.
Finally, it is not a trust merely because the instrument designates
the bank a "trustee" and the insured a "settlor", or because para-
graphs are included referring to the reservation by the insured of the
right to revoke the "trust", or referring to the "trust hereby created".
It is elementary that the words "trust" and "trustee" do not always
show a trust.9
Although a contract, other than the bailment of the policies, does
not arise at the time they are delivered to the bank, something more
than a mere bailment takes place. In effect, the bank, in addition
to the subsidiary agreement of bailment, promises that it will receive,
hold, and pay out the proceeds of the policies according to the terms
of the instrument, if and after the policies become payable. In other
words, the bank makes a written offer to the insured to act as a trustee
after his death. This offer requires an acceptance by the insured
before the transaction is raised to the dignity of a contract. But the
insured suffers no detriment and makes no promise. The lapse of all
the policies will not work a breach of contract.
The insured, in effect, says to the bank that he may continue the
policies in force and that if he does maintain them and does not
change the beneficiary away from the bank, the bank may act as
'Wood v. Burnham, 6 Paige 513 (N. Y. 1837), aff'd, 26 Wend. 9 (N. Y. 184).
PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929) C. 12.
739 Cyc. 33.
8See EXPLANATORY NOTES ON TRUSTS (Tentative Draft No. i, The American
Law Institute) 6.
9Hathaway v. Hathaway, 37 Hun 265 (N. Y. 1885); In re Hawley, IO4 N. Y.
250, io N. E. 352 (1887). RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS (Tentative
Draft No. i, The American Law Institute) § 36.
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trustee after his death. To put it in another way, the bank makes an
offer of a promise for an act, the act to be the maintenance of the
policies in force until the death of the insured. If the insured, induced
by the offer, performs the act and the bank's offer has not been with-
drawn, a binding contract is perfected on the death of the insured. 10
The bank must then collect the avails of the policies and administer
the same as trustee according to the contract.
(b) Unfunded trust where policies are assigned.
In the foregoing section, it was assumed that the bank was named
in the policy as trustee-beneficiary while the legal title to the policies
remained in the insured. Let us next consider the situation where the
insured assigns the policies to the bank as trustee. In such case a
trust is immediately created, because the legal title in the policies
passes to the bank." In this arrangement the beneficiaries under the
trust are named in the instrument, but, of course, do not receive any
income during the life of the insured. This fact, however, does not in
any way invalidate the trust, which takes effect immediately. The
enjoyment is postponed until after death, but the rights of the
beneficiaries accrue before.'2
In many instances the settlor reserves the power to revoke the
entire trust and require the reassignment of the policies to himself,
thereby terminating the interests of all parties. Such power of rev-
ocation, however, does not impair the trust qua trust;13 and, more-
over, does not render it a testamentary disposition.14 The trust is
10In referring to the duty of the trustee in such a case, the court in Kerr v.
Crane, 212 Mass. 224, 229, 98 N. E. 783, 785 (1912) made the following statement:
"His prospective obligation becomes binding only when his contingent interest
has become absolute."
"A policy of life insurance is held to constitute a contract to pay a certain sum
to the payee on the death of the insured, and is a chose in action with all the usual
incidents pertaining thereto. [Steinback v. Diepenbrock, i58 N. Y. 24, 52 N. E.
662 (1899)]. As a chose in action the policy is property capable of being held in
trust by the bank as assignee. [Johnston v. Scott, 76 Misc. 641, 137 N. Y. Supp.
243 (Sup.'Ct. 1912)1.12Gilman v. McArdle, 99 N. Y. 451, 459, 2 N. E. 464, 468 (1885); Van Cott v.
Prentice, 104 N. Y. 45, IO N. BE. 257 (1887); Grafing v. Heilmann, i App. Div.
26o, 37 N. Y. Supp. 253 (2d Dept. 1896), aft'd, 153 N. Y. 673, 48 N. E. 1io4
(1897); Robb v. Washington & Jefferson College, 185 N. Y. 485, 78 N. E. 359
(i9o6); Johnston v. Scott, supra note i i.
3Van Cott v. Prentice, supra note 12; Brown v. Spohr, supra note 3; Schreyer
v. Schreyer, iOl App. Div. 456, 91 N. Y. Supp. 1o65 (ist Dept. 1905), affd, 182
N. Y. 555, 75 N. E. 1134 (1905).
14Matter of Dies, 50 N. Y. 88 (1872); Gilman v. McArdle; Robb v. Washington
& Jefferson College, both supra note 12; Lauterbach v. New York Inv. Co.,
supra note 2; Johnston v. Scott, supra note II.
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good and effectual as if irrevocable until the power is exercised.1 5
Nor does a reservation of the power to modify the terms of the trust,
even to the extent of substituting new beneficiaries to receive the
income after the settlor's death, render the trust invalid or the trans-
fer a testamentary disposition. Major continet in se minus, and if
an entire trust may be revoked by the settlor, a provision reserving
the power of modification may be included.8 Of course, if the power
to revoke or modify is not reserved, it is lost when the policies. are
assigned, and no changes may thereafter be made by the settlor ex-
cept with the consent of all those beneficially interested under the
instrument. 17
(c) Funded trust.
In a funded insurance trust, income-producing property is trans-
ferred to the bank, the income to be used during the lifetime of the
insured to pay the premiums on the policies, which are also delivered
to the bank. The trust agreement provides for the disposition of
the proceeds of the insurance and also of the original income-pro-
ducing trust property. There is no doubt that as to the latter a trust
is created at the date of the transfer of the property to the bank.
The settlor parts with the legal title and all elements of an ordinary
express trust are present. Furthermore, as has been stated in the
foregoing section, a trust of the policies immediately comes into being
provided they are assigned. On the other hand, if the policies are not
assigned but the bank is merely named as trustee-beneficiary, no
trust as to the policies is created during the lifetime of the insured.
Prior to the year 1927 there was grave doubt in New York as to
the legality of a funded life insurance trust on the ground that it
'-Van Cott v. Prentice, supra note 12; Von Hesse v. MacKaye, 136 N. Y. 114,
32 N. E. 615 (1892). PERRY, op. cit. supra note 6, § 104.
16Perry, op. cit. supra note 6, 497. Brown v. Spohr, supra note 3; Schreyer v.
Schreyer, supra note 13.
"Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Haven, supra note 3, at 483, lO8 N. E. at
824; Dorman v. Balestier, 175 N. Y. Supp. 677 (Sup. Ct. 1919); Gage v. Irving
Bank & Trust Co., 222 App. Div. 92, 225 N. Y. Supp. 476 (2d Dept. 1927), aff'd,
248 N. Y. 554, 162 N. E. 522 (1928); N. Y. CONS. LAWS, C. 41 (PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY LAW) § 23.
The provision in the policy that the insured has the right to change the benefici-
ary thereunder does not empower the insured, after an assignment pursuant to an
irrevocable trust, to defeat the trust by an attempted exercise of such right
(Johnston v. Scott, supra note ii). The assignment and not the policy controls.
Of course, an insurance company having no notice of the assignment would be
protected in paying the proceeds to whatever beneficiary was named on the face
of the policy. See article by Francis J. Wright, Designation of a Trustee as Bene-
ficiary, Best's Insurance News, August I, 1930, pp. 282-287.
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involved an unlawful accumulation of income. 8 This situation was
partially remedied in that year by an amendment to Section 16 of the
Personal Property Law. 19 This amendment, however, according to
its terms saves the funded trust only where the policies are included
in the trust and constitute a res. Therefore, in order to gain the pro-
tection of the amendment, the policies must be assigned t6 the bank
so as to vest title in it as trustee. If they are not assigned, but the
bank is merely named as trustee-beneficiary, there is no "trust in
property consisting of or including a policy or policies" of life insurance,
and the statute would have no application. Such a trust in its en-
tirety would perhaps be subject to successful attack as violating the
rule against accumulations.
The rule against accumulations may be violated in still other ways
unless care is taken. The amendment above mentioned relates only
to the income used for the payment of premiums. Therefore, pro-
vision should be made with respect to the surplus income from the
securities deposited with the bank. Such surplus, over and above the
amounts required to pay the premiums, must be paid by the bank
to someone and may not be held until the death of the insured.
In the next place, the trust instrument should provide for some
lawful disposition of any proceeds realized on the policies prior to the
death of the insured. For example, if a policy lapses and the bank
receives the cash surrender value, the same may not be held and
accumulated until the death of the insured to be then added to the
avails of the other policies.
Many funded trust agreements provide that on the death of the
insured the proceeds of the policies shall be added to the trust fund
already held by the bank to meet premiums, and that thereafter the
income from the consolidated fund shall be paid to certain life ben-
'
8See Bogert, Funded Insurance Trusts and the Rule against Accumulations,
(1924) 9 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 113-I37. However, in the case of In re
Hartmann's Estate, 126 Misc. 862, 215 N. Y. Supp. 802 (Surr. Ct. 1926) where a
testator created a trust directing his executors to set aside an annuity sufficient
to pay the premiums on a policy insuring the life of his son-in-law, it was held
that this did not constitute an accumulation. The reasoning in this case has been
seriously challenged. See Hanna, Some Legal Aspects of Life Insurance Trusts
(1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 346, 368-370.
"The amendment reads as follows: "Provided that a deed or other instrument
which creates or declares a trust in property consisting of or including a policy or
policies of life, health, accident or disability insurance and directs that the income
of such trust shall be applied in whole or in part to the payment of premiums
upon such policy or policies shall not be considered as effecting an accumulation
either of the income so used for the payment of premiums or of the dividends on
such policy or policies."
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eficiaries until the termination of the trust. Such a provision may -
easily violate the rule against perpetuities where the trust as to the
income-producing property is irrevocable. The latter fund should
be treated separately because the absolute ownership thereof may
already have been suspended for one life when the insured dies. The
proceeds of the policies, on the contrary, may be trusteed for two
lives after the settlor's death, provided the trust as to the policies is
made revocable during the life of the insured, or provided certain
circumstances exist as pointed out in the following paragraphs.
II. "Two LIvEs IN BEING"
The New York statute provides that the absolute ownership of
personal property shall not be suspended by any limitation or con-
dition for longer than two lives in being at the date of the instrument
containing such limitation or condition, or, if such instrument is a
will, for longer than two lives in being at the death of the testator,
except that a contingent gift in remainder may be made on a prior
gift in remainder, to take effect in the event that the persons to whom
the first remainder is limited die under the age of twenty-one years,
or on any other contingency by which the interest of such persons
may be determined before they attain full age.2
As has been pointed out, if the policies are assigned, either in an
unfunded or a funded agreement, a trust is thereby presently created.
If, further, a power of revocation is reserved to the settlor in the
trust deed, the absolute ownership of the policies and other property
is not suspended at all during his life.2' On the other hand, if the
trust, either funded or unfunded, is irrevocable, the question arises
as to the application of the statute on the suspension of ownership.
The statute has no application in an unfunded arrangement where
the policies are not assigned, because in that case, it is submitted,
there is no trust until the death of the insured. 22 The insured has the
legal title to the policies throughout his life and consequently there
is no suspension. If, however, the policies are assigned in an unfunded
irrevocable trust, may it be said that the absolute ownership thereof
is suspended during the life of the insured? Of course, the question
is academic unless the settlor desires to trustee the proceeds of the
policies for two lives after his death; this, however, is often the case.
2 0N. Y. CONS. LAWS, c. 41 (PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW) § ii, as amended by
N. Y. Laws 1929, C. 229, § I8.
2
'Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Pratt, II7 Misc. 708, 193 N. Y. Supp.
152 (Sup. Ct. 1922), aff'd, 206 App. Div. 689, I99 N. Y. Supp. 921 (ist Dept.
1923). uSee first section of this article.
PERSONAL LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS
The qtiestion does not admit of a categorical answer, because the
terms of instruments differ. If all the parties beneficially interested
in the trust, whether as life beneficiaries or remaindermen, are adults,
the absolute ownership is not suspended during the life of the insured.
This is because by statute such persons could consent in writing to the
revocation of the trust by the settlor.2 Thus there are persons in
being who could convey an absolute title in possession.
The absolute ownership would not be suspended during the life
of the insured for still another reason, provided all life beneficiaries
and remaindermen are of full age. Since a trust in which the res
consists of life insurance policies is not a trust to receive the income
of personal property and to apply it to the use of any person, the
interests of the beneficiaries may be assigned, and they in conjunction
with the remaindermen and trustee could convey to a third person.24
In fact, if the life tenants and remaindermen joined in an assignment,
the trustee would be obliged to transfer the policies to the assignee.?
The above reasoning, both as to revocation by consent and assign-
ability of interests, also applies in the case of an irrevocable funded
life insurance trust, so far as the policies are concerned. Likewise,
as to the income-producing fund, the above reasoning with respect
to revocation by consent applies. If all persons beneficially interested
in the income-producing fund are of full age, there is no suspension
during the life of the settlor because by statute they may consent
to the revocation of the trust by the settlor. 6 In such a special case,
the trust instrument may provide that the income-producing fund be
held in trust for two lives after the death of the insured.
The reasoning, however, with respect to the possibility of the
alienation of the interests of the beneficiaries is inapplicable to the
income-producing fund, because this is a trust to receive the income
of personal property and to apply it to the use of some person. If a
person other than the settlor is entitled to the surplus of the income-
2N. Y. CONS. LAWS, c. 41 (PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW) § 23. Williams v. Sage,
i8o.App. Div. I, 167 N. Y. Supp. 179 (2d Dept. 1917); Cazzani v. Title G. &T.
Co., 175 App. Div. 369, x61 N. Y. Supp. 884 (Ist. Dept. 19x6), aff'd, 220 N. Y.
683, x16 N. E. 1040 (1917); Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N. Y. 298,
165 N. E. 454 (1929).
24N. Y. CONS. LAWS, c. 41 (PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW) § 15. Wells v. Squires,
117 App. Div. 5o8, 102 N. Y.. Supp. 597 (Ist Dept. 1907), aff'd, 191 N. Y. 529,
84 N. E. 1122 (19o8); Hammerstein v. Equitable Trust Co., 156 App. Div. 644,
I41 N. Y. Supp. IO65 (Ist Dept. 1912), aff'd, 2o9 N. Y. 429, 103 N. E. 7o6 (1913).25Wells v. Squires, supra note 24. CHAPLIN, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF
ALIENATION AND POSTPONEMENT OF VESTING UNDER THE LAWS OF NEW YORK
(3rd ed. 1928) § 49o.
26N. Y. CONS. LAWS, c. 41 (PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW) § 23.
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producing fund over and above the amount of the premiums, or if
the said fund is to continue to be held in trust after the death of the
settlor, or if a person other than the settlor would be directly obli-
gated to pay the premiums if it were not for the trust fund and such
person consequently receives the direct benefit of the income from
such fund, the interests of the beneficiaries are inalienable under the
statute.
27
Returning to our original question as to the suspension during the
life of the insured of the absolute ownership of the policies in an ir-
revocable funded or unfunded trust, the answer would appear to be
that the ownership is suspended except in the case where all those
beneficially interested in the trust are of full age.
The practical effect of such suspension is important. It means
that where policies are assigned irrevocably, except in the special
case described, one measuring life is exhausted when the insured dies.
Hence the proceeds of the policies in an irrevocable trust, either
funded or unfunded, where the policies are assigned, except in the
special case noted above, may be held in trust for only one life after
the death of the insured.
III. UNBoRN LIFE BENEFICIARIES
A very interesting and practical question arises when the insured,
in an ordinary unfunded arrangement where the bank is named
trustee-beneficiary and the title to the policies remains in the insured,
directs that the proceeds of the policies shall be divided into as many
separate trusts as the insured leaves children him surviving, whether
in being at the time the instrument is executed or born thereafter.
The statute, enacted long before the recent growth of life insurance
trusts, provides that, "The absolute ownership of personal property
shall not be suspended by any limitation or condition, for a longer
period than during the continuance and until the termination of not
more than two lives in being at the date of the instrument containing
such limitation or condition, or, if such instrument be a last will and
testament, for not more than two lives in being at the death of the
testator.. ,,8 As has been said above, there is no suspension and
no trust during the life of the insured where he retains title to the
policies; when he dies, however, the insurance proceeds become
trust funds and the period of suspension begins. Is it necessary that
every life beneficiary who is now to receive income have been in
being on the day the instrument was executed?
27N. Y. CONS, LAWS, c. 41 (PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW) § x5. In reUnited States
Mortgage & Trust Co., 130 Misc. 635, 224 N. Y. Supp. 599 (Surr. Ct. 1927).
2SN. Y. CONS. LAWS, c. 41 (PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW) § ii.
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The statute is primarily directed to testamentary and living trusts,
and relates to the respective times such trusts are created. A Will
speaks as of the date of death; the statute, therefore, only requires
that the beneficiaries of a testamentary trust be in existence at the
death of the testator, when the trust period begins. A living trust
speaks from the date of its creation, which ordinarily is the date on
which the written trust instrument is executed by the settlor; the
statute, therefore, requires that the beneficiaries shall be in being at
the date of the instrument, which presumably means the date of its
execution, which in turn usually coincides with the creation of the trust.
In a life insurance trust where the policies are assigned to the
trustee, the transaction results in a living trust. The duties of the
trustee, to be sure, are not numerous, unless the trust is funded, but
they are, nevertheless, present and quite real. The bank is to hold
title to the policies and is not a mere custodian thereof; the bank
must protect the policies with all the zeal of a trustee and not merely
with the care of a bailee. The bank will also be charged with the
duties and responsibilities of a trustee in the collection of the pro-
ceeds of the policies, whereas in the case where the bank does not
hold title to the policies, it will collect the proceeds by virtue of its
obligation as a party bound by a contract and will become a trustee
only after it receives the money from the insurance company.29 Since
the assignment of the policies results in a living trust, there can be
little doubt that the requirement as to lives in being at the date of
the execution of the trust agreement will be imposed by the courts.
Less justification, however, appears for such a holding where the
policies are not assigned and no trust is created until after the death
of the insured. Here the insured is looking forward primarily to the
time subsequent to his death when the proceeds become available to
the trustee. In such a case, since the title does not pass, the absolute
ownership is not suspended under any circumstances during the life
of the insured. Hence no social purpose appears for a statute directed
against this situation. Furthermore, the statutory rule against
suspension of ownership must be and has been strictly construed
because it is a derogation fromthe common law.30 Itwouldseemthat
a court should struggle to hold the statute inapplicable in the field of
unfunded insurance "trusts".
The statute does not define the words "date of the instrument",
which phrase may conceivably mean either the date of the execution
of the instrument or the effective date of the instrument. The
21See first section of this article.
3OPerin v. Carey, 24 How. 465 (U. S. i86o); Cochrane v. Schell, i4o N. Y. 516,
532, 35 N. E. 971, 976 (1894).
29
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
question as to the interpretation of this phrase does not appear to
have been expressly adjudicated with respect to life insurance trusts.
The effective date of an unfunded life insurance "trust" instrument
where the policies are not assigned, is not the date when the instru-
ment is signed but the date of the death of the insured. There is no
trust and no contract, beyond the bailment of the policies, so long as
the insured lives; there is merely a continuing offer on the part of the
bank to act as trustee of whatever insurance moneys it is enabled to
collect by virtue of the continued maintenance of the policies by the
insured.
The argument here presented as to the interpretation of the phrase
"date of the instrument" may be thought too refined. At least one
writer on the subject of life insurance trusts assumes that the words
mean the date of the execution of the instrument and he warns
against attempting to provide for after-born children.3
In whatever way the courts may construe the phrase in question,
it would seem to admit of no argument that it is socially desirable
that a man be allowed to direct the disposition of the proceeds of his
insurance so as to include trusts for all children that may be born to
him. Otherwise, the birth of every new child necessitates a new or
amended instrument. It is quite possible that the father may post-
pone until too late the revision of the instrument, or he may have
become mentaily incompetent. At any rate, the after-born child
mayfind himself destitute while his brothers and sisters are well taken
care of, all without any fault on the part of his father. To remove
all ambiguity in the statute, the legislature should amend it in the
light of the recent tremendous growth of life insurance trusts.
IV. THE MANNER OF EXECUTING THE INSTRUMENT
The question is sometimes raised as to the testamentary character
of the unfunded "trust" where the policies are not assigned. If such
-a transaction is a testamentary disposition, the instrument must be
executed with the formalities required in the case of a will and must
be probated after the death of the insured. It is argued that since no
present interest passes to the bank during the lifetime of the insured,
especially where the right to change the beneficiary is reserved, and
since the instrument only takes effect at his death, such document is
a will. This theory, however, loses sight of certain facts.
It is true that the rights of the trustee-beneficiary, like those of
any beneficiary, 2 where the right to change the beneficiary is reserved,
31Hanna, op. cit. supra note 18, -at 359. See also, SHATTUCK, THE LIVING
INSURANCE TRUST (1928) 40-41.
32With the possible exception of the case where the wife of the insured is the
beneficiary. Wagner v. Thieriot, 203 App. Div. 757, 197 N. Y. Supp. .56o (Ist
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are entirely contingent, uncertain, and revocable during the life of
the insured." It is also true that no property interest in the policies
passes to the bank during the life of the insured. Likewise it is true
that outside of the bailment of the policies, which feature may be
separately regarded,m the instrument does not take effect until the
death of the insured. If these were the only considerations, the
instrument might perhaps be required to be executed as a will."1
The distinguishing point, however, is that a policy of life insurance
is not deemed an asset of the estate of the insured unless payable to
the insured, his executors or administrators." The mere fact that
the insured has title to a policy and may change the beneficiary does
not make the policy or its proceeds part of his estate; the money goes
directly to the named beneficiary. The rule is not otherwise where
the beneficiary is a trustee; the proceeds do not form part of the
estate of the insured, whether or not the insured has reserved the
right to change the beneficiary.37
Inasmuch as neither the policies nor their proceeds constitute part
of the estate of the insured at his death, it becomes immaterial in
what particular manner some instrument may have been executed
by which the beneficiary under the policy is to hold or distribute the
proceeds. After the death of the insured the instrument is merely
evidence of a contract rendered binding at his death, under which
contract the bank must collect the insurance and hold it in trust.
It has already been expressly held in a case where the policies were
assigned and a trust was established during the life of the insured,
that the plan was not testamentary in character.38 In the Voorhees'
case3sa the Court said:
Dept. 1923), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 588, I42 N. E. 295 (1923); cf. earlier case of
McGowin v. Menken, 223 N. Y. 509, 513, 119 N. E. 877 (1918).
nMcGowin v. Menken, supra note 32; Schoenholz v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 234
N. Y. 24, 136 N. E. 227 (1922); Eltonhead v. Travelers' Ins. Co., I77 App. Div.
170, 163 N. Y. Supp. 838 (ist Dept. 1917); Strianesev. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 221 App. Div. 8i, 223 N. Y. Supp. I6 (1st Dept. 1927).
3"The presence of the bailment feature does not serve to prove that the in-
strument in other respects is not a will. The same instrument may be a will and
also contain a contract. See 40 Cyc. IO88-IO89.
35Matter of Diez, supra note I4; Butler v. Sherwood, 196 App. Div. 603, 188
N. Y. Supp. 242 (3d Dept. 1921), aff'd, 233 N. Y. 655, 135 N. E. 957 (1922).
31Matter of Van Dermoor, 42 Hun 326 (N. Y. 1886); In re Fay's Estate, 25
Misc. 468, 55 N. Y. Supp. 749 (Surr. Ct. 1898); Wagner v. Thieriot, supra note
32; Matter of Knoedler, i4o N. Y. 377, 35 N. E. 6oi (1893).
17Matter of Van Dermoor, supra note 36; In re Voorhees' Estate, 2oo App. Div.
259, 193 N. Y. Supp. 168 (3d Dept. 1922).
38Itt re Voorhees' Estate,supra note 37;Johnston v. Scott, supra note ii. See also,
In re Haedrich's Estate, 134 Misc. 741, 236 N. Y. Supp. 395 (Surr. Ct. 1929).
asupra note 37, at 264, 193 N. Y. Supp. at 172.
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"He has indeed by his trust deeds directed how the proceeds
of these policies shall be distributed after death, and named the
conditions under which the beneficiaries should take. But this
is the effect in principle of every life policy payable at death to
another than the assured or his estate."
The same reasoning would apply where the policies are not assigned
but the bank is named in the policies as trustee-beneficiary under an
ordinary unfunded arrangement. 39
V. THE INSURANCE COMPANY AS TRUSTEE
For the most part insurance companies do not attempt to act as
trustees under life insurance trust agreements. Every effort is
usually made to co-operate rather than compete with trust companies.
On the other hand, some insurance corporations have accepted ap-
pointment as trustee under life insurance trust agreements, and it
therefore becomes important to note the legal incidents arising in
such cases.
It would seem that no insurance corporation, domestic or foreign,
may exercise in New York the power to receive deposits of money,
securities, or other personal property in trust; nor may any insurance
corporation, domestic or foreign, exercise in New York the power to
take, accept, or execute any trust or power of whatever nature or
description, whether involving real or personal property, committed
or entrusted to it by any person by grant, assignment, transfer, devise,
bequest or otherwise.40
Despite the inclusive language of the statute, it would nevertheless
seem clear that a foreign insurance corporation, lawfully acting as
trustee in the state of its creation, could send the income from the
trust to New York beneficiaries. This could hardly be construed as
the "execution" of a trust in New York; a contrary holding would,
of course, lead to absurd results.
It is most doubtful that any insurance corporation, domestic or
foreign, may ever act as trustee under a life insurance trust, unless
such power is expressly granted by statute or is lawfully included in
the charter of the company. The situation is unlike that in which an
insurance corporation pursuant to an option settlement pays definite
sums of money at fixed times to the beneficiaries. Such payments
are made according to a rigid contract with the insured, and are made
39Such holding was in fact made more than twenty years ago. This was the case
of Lauterbach v. New York Inv. Co., supra note 2. However, it might be argued
under the facts of that case that the insured had transferred title in the policies to
the trustee. Such is the view of that case apparently taken by Frank Irvine in
his article on "Trusts" in 39 Cyc. at pp. 76-77.40N. Y. CONS. LAWS, C. 2 (BANKING LAW) § 223.
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from the general funds of the company. There is no particular trust
res, and no discretionary power in the corporation.4'
It is true the ancient rule that a corporation aggregate could never
act as trustee has long been exploded; but a modem corporation
may act as trustee only under certain conditions. In the first place,
the corporation must have the legal capacity to take real or personal
property for corporate purposes.4 This capacity is sometimes con-
ferred on all corporations by general act.44 An insurance corporation,
however, may be strictly limited as to the extent of real property
holdings,45 and its capacity to take and hold real property in a funded
insurance trust, or to purchase real property for a trust, would be
highly questionable.
In the second place, a corporation, insurance or otherwise, cannot
take and hold property in trust for a purpose in which the corporation
has no interest or which is foreign or repugnant to the objects for
which the corporation was created.46 This does not mean that a
trust must be strictly within the scope of the direct purposes of the
institution of the corporation, but the trust must certainly be at
least collateral to such purposes.47 Whether a trust formed from the
proceeds of life insurance, the income from which is payable to pri-
vate individuals with no relation to the insurance company, is
sufficiently germane to the direct purposes of a corporation created
to write life insurance, is an open question. It may perhaps be
doubted that the administration of such a trust is necessary or proper
for the exercise of the powers conferred upon a life insurance cor-
poration.45
41M. A. Linton, Life Insurance Trusts from the Life Underwriter's Point of View,
BEST'S INSURANCE NEWS, July I, 1930, at 199-203.
2Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. 127 (U. S. 1844). 43/bid.
44E.-g., in N. Y. CONS. LAWS, C. 22 (GENERAL CORPORATION LAW) § 14 (3).
45N. Y. CONS. LAWS, C." 27 (INSURANCE LAW) § 20.
4'Vidal v. Girard's Executors, supra note 42; Jackson v. Hartwell, 8 Johns.
422 (N.Y. 1811); Matter of Howe, I Paige 214 (N. Y. 1828); Currin v. Fanning, 13
Hun 458 (N. Y. 1878); Sheldon v. Chappell, 47 Hun 59 (N. Y. 1888); 14a C. J.
514-515. 47Vidal v. Girard's Executors, supra note 42.
48An insurance corporation has no implied power to engage in banking. Thus
an insurance company may not issue notes or bills of exchange [Utica Ins. Co. v.
Cadwell, 3 Wend. 296 (N. Y. 1829)]; nor engage in the business of discounting
[New York Firemen Ins. Co. v. Sturges, 2 Cow. 664 (N. Y. 1824)]; nor issue
negotiable bonds, not under seal, payable to the order of one of its clbxks and
endorsed in blank, in the form of ordinary post notes of banking institutions
[Att'y Gen. v. Life and Fire Ins. Co., 9 Paige 47o (N. Y. 1842)]. An act of the
legislature incorporating a fire insurance corporation was strictly construed
in the case of The People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 358 (N.Y. 1818). The com-
pany was doing certain business of a banking nature with the result that quo
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In the third place, an insurance company when it seeks to act as
trustee under a life insurance trust may find itself in a position where
its interests as a corporation conflict with its duties as a trustee. If
one or more of the trust policies was written by the trustee, the com-
pany as trustee might be embarrassed if there were some defense to
the payment of the policy. The company cannot sue itself.49
In conclusion, however, it is not to be forgotten that the mere
appointment of an insurance corporation as trustee does not invali-
date a life insurance trust. If the original trustee is incapable of
acting as such, a new trustee will be substituted by the proper court,
possessing equity jurisdiction, to enforce and administer the trust.Y
warranto proceedings were brought. In rendering judgment of ouster the court
said (at 383): "It becomes my duty, however, to notice, a little more particularly,
the several parts of the act which have been relied upon as conferring such
powers. The preamble is said to contain some such intimation, because it declares,
that this company ought to be liberally encouraged. This is certainly a pretty
forced extension of that expression, and not warranted by anything contained
in the recital, which states, that incorporating an insurance company which had
been formed in Utica, would tend to mitigate the calamities of fire, give security
to manufacturers, and confidence to those who adventure their property on our
vast navigable waters; that those are laudable objects, and that a company
promoting them ought to be liberally encouraged. But it is far fetched, indeed,
to suppose that the right of carrying on banldng operations was intended or
intimated by this liberal encouragement. The second section, which professes to
enumerate and define the powers of the company, does not contain an intimation
that the right of banking is among such powers; and it cannot grow out of the
general clause which authorizes them to transact all the business generally per.
formed by insurance companies, excepting certain specified kinds of business
therein particularly mentioned. It was, however, contended on the argument,
that the right of carrying on banking operations was necessarily incident to the
corporation, because not expressly prohibited, if they had surplus funds which
they could spare for that purpose. But I cannot assent to this rule of construing a
charter of incorporation for a specific object. Such an incorporated company have
no rights except such as are specially granted, and those that are necessary to
carry into effect the powers so granted. Many powers and capacities are tacitly
annexed to a corporation duly created; but they are such only as are necessary to
carry into effect the purposes for which it was established. The specification of
certain powers operates as a restraint to such objects only, and is an implied
prohibition of the exercise of other and distinct powers. A contrary doctrine
would be productive of mischievous consequences, especially with us, where
charter privileges have been so alarmingly multiplied."
4 9This difficulty arose in the case of New York Life Insurance Co. v. O'Brien,
27 F. (2d) 773 (W. D. Mich. 1927), appeal dismissed on stipulation of counsel,
22 F. (2d) Ioi6, 1017 (C. C. A. 6th 1927). In that case the New York Life In-
surance Company was removed as trustee in favor of the Grand Rapids Trust
Company.
5OVidal v. Girard's Executors, supra note 42. See also, RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW OF TRUSTS, (Tentative Draft No. i, The American Law Institute) § 97.
